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1.0  Introduction 
 Despite early and repeated predictions of a short half-life that afflicts 
merely fashionable ideas, regional cluster concepts continue to thrive in diverse 
policy theatres and benefit from the intense scrutiny of many disciplines, having 
already entered the provisional realm of numerous theoretical frameworks.  
Cluster concepts obtain their greatest traction in those fields concerned with 
aggregates of firms and near-market agents that self-assemble in progressively 
larger constellations and networks comprising whole economies, whether at 
regional, national or supra-national levels.  Clusters also offer an analytically-
appealing intermediate level of economic “granularity” that accords well with 
parallel theoretical developments in the new economic geography, endogenous 
growth theory, knowledge economy, innovation systems, etc.  While economic 
clusters still remain theoretically -underdeveloped, they enjoy valuable face-
validity that continues to propel policy interest, generate support and attract 
intellectual resources.  Several other chapters of this volume develop various 
themes along these lines. 
 This chapter will focus attention on available concepts that permit better 
understanding of how clustered aggregations of dynamic firms come to 
dominate certain technologies and markets as powerful innovation and growth 
mechanisms, and why the same dominant aggregations may later morph 
successfully into novel combinations or decline into oblivion, becoming—in 
Wilbur Thompson’s unforgettably term—“industrial hospices”.  While the 
policy interest in this topic  is self-evident, theoretical interests might benefit 
from a more complete accounting of “why” clusters may , at different life-cycle 
stages, be dynamically innovative, highly productive, highly concentrated, yet in 
the end exhibit fatal vulnerabilities.  We shall also use their “life-cycle” 1 as a 
                                                
1 Although not explicitly addressed in the literature, a cluster’s cyclical dynamics should be measured by 
variations in aggregate outcome produced by all principal agents responsible for cluster performance.  Therefore, 
to fully account for a “cluster” and its position on or movement along its life-cycle, one should a. account for all 
agents considered significant along each cycle segment, and b. devise an aggregation principle by which agent 
actions are weighted and summed.  Collateral work concerning identification of cluster agents is available in the 
diffuse research regarding cluster identification and mapping, but little of it refers to the relative significance of 
agents at various cycle stages or the outputs of non-firm agents.  The literature appears not to have considered 
any aggregation principle for weighting and summing the full cluster; most studies that examine a cluster’s 
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selective lens by which to reexamine clusters, with the intent to reveal certain 
structural facets or relationships not previously considered or always made 
evident. 
 Maskell and Kebir (2005) use the terms “existence”, “extension” and 
“exhaus tion” to describe specific cluster life-cycle stages; attention to these 
stages is essential, they argue, because certain modern cluster theory versions 
replaced earlier, more robust concepts with “…a one-sided model that addressed 
the existence argument in novel ways but almost totally disregarded the 
extension and exhaustion arguments.” (p. 6, emphasis supplied).  The present 
intention is therefore to help remedy such oversights by explicitly evaluating 
literatures that consider the full range of cluster cycle stages and by unpacking 
their cycle-phase implications for further consideration2 .  Accordingly, the 
chapter will examine principal cluster cycle concepts, including selected 
overview of the dynamics that propel clusters along their life-cycles and 
consideration of key factors seen to be relevant at various cluster cycle stages.   
2.0 Cluster Cycles and Phases 
 Cluster cycles are usually represented either in text or diagrams as stylized 
“S” curves, modeled generally after industry-, technology- or product-cycles3 
and often with the quite similar terms of reference.  However, attention has also 
shifted to specific points on/stages along the curve associated with: the 
emergence of a cluster, its early development and expansion, its ability to 
exploit opportunities and resist competitive replication, its attaining hyper -
growth and engaging in scale-expansion, its slowing near potential inflection 
points, and its successful transition to a newly -launched cycle phase or perhaps 
the “lock-in” and exhaustion of its final cycle phase.  Changes in the cluster 
during its cycle phases can result from gaining new or losing old agents (mainly 
firms), shifts in the scale and scope of activities among stage-incumbent firms, 
or both4 . 
 Of the many distinctions drawn to categorize types of clusters, perhaps the 
most important for present purposes is traded (exported) vs. non-traded cluster 
division, which applies the classic export-base logic to clusters5.  This 
distinction has increased in importance during recent periods of intense 
                                                                                                                                                     
performance or outcome rely upon a simple summation of some metric of cluster firm performance as its proxy.  
The absence of commonly collected me trics at the cluster level  is a major stumbling block to progress along 
these lines, although it is unclear if all cycle-phase dynamics can be measured adequately with a single metric.  
2 Although a considerable policy-oriented literature is available that presents widely varying and occasionally 
conflicting measures, it will not be systematically reviewed here to focus on the underlying conceptual issues. 
3“In Utterback (1994), the S-curve model is used to illustrate the life cycle, where the evolution of the 
technology, industry or product follow an S-shaped curve over time”(Dalum, Pederson, and Villumsen, 2005).  
See also Wolter (2004), pp 1 -2. 
4 Most articles also adopt an implicit stylized version of a “representative agent”; a full cluster is then seen to 
move/age homogenously through each cycle phase as a synchronized ensemble.  Empirically, this usually 
implies that the dynamics of a single lead sector (or even one firm) proxies the central tendency of the full 
ensemble, even though in fact, many firms of varying size or sectors and other agents of several kind could 
positioned at adjacent but not identical phases.   
5 See discussion in Porter, 2003, p. 559. 
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international trade and globalization, both of which further concentrate 
production and increase technological or industry specialization, a point 
remarked upon by Krugman (1991, p. 1) when he first considered the usefulness 
of spatial and geographic features to analyze international trade.  As clusters 
become ever more specialized, they also exhibit stronger technological, product 
and industrial life-cycles that characterize their key building blocks.  Clusters 
with the most pronounced life-cycle behavior therefore are likely to be 
specialized in globally-traded goods, while regionally traded goods (cultural-, 
territoria l- or tradition-intensive) are less susceptible to dynamic life-cycles due 
to the slowly changing quasi-oligopolistic  niches they occupy6.  Non-traded 
clusters of locally produced and consumed goods or services are wholly 
creatures of their host regions, where local firms co-locate production or sales  in 
accordance with sub-regional Hotelling—not inter-regional Marshallian—
incen tives. 
 The literature’s focus on the dynamics of specific development stages is 
due in part to the relatively high frequency of stage-specific cases studied, which 
are necessarily positioned at the time and cycle-phase when the case was 
studied, or other specific  cases may reflect a cyclical circumstance judged 
important by cluster study patrons7.  Despite a marked preoccupation in the 
literature with “lock-in” phase issues, much cluster research continues as a 
matter of routine to dwell on the “existence” stage of successful, contemporary 
clusters, particularly among distinct research communities 8; this leads Maskell 
and Kebir (2005) to observe that cluster theory remains incomplete and possibly 
misleading in the absence of life-cycle considerations.  However, other recent 
research and publication reveal growing interest for a variety of reasons in 
examining more closely the broader question of cluster cycles and in discussing 
more than a single stage, a sampling of which will now be reviewed. 
 
 
(Cluster Life-cycle Sources  Table about here) 
                                                
6 Regionally traded clusters can, however, be highly innovative and advanced (van den Hertog, Bergman, and 
Charles, 2001). Regionally-traded clusters may also serve as valuable reservoirs of novelty for goods and 
services demanded by future customers, similar to presently growing consumption of cultural tourism.  Culinary, 
sartorial and architectural  consumer novelty now available in many regional reservoirs is also matched by locally 
specific capacities to manage environments (e.g., Alpine tunneling or Israeli desalinization technologies, 
Japanese quake-resistant construction, Dutch seawater management) and natural resources, any of which could 
gain importance in future global markets. 
7 Such studies are usually commissioned for emerging and growing clusters that have or are expected to become 
dominant.  Lesser or merely aspiring clusters seldom figure prominently in life -cycle considerations, and “…we 
still wait for that famous case study of a cluster in decline.” (Lorenzen, 2005, p. 207).   
8 “It is, perhaps, at this stage worth noting how later generations of mainly Anglo-Saxon scholars by deliberat e 
decision or following the prevailing tradition in contemporary economic geography gradually turned to 
producing very descriptive, ideographic work…[which replaced former economics-based cluster explanations 
with] ”…a one-sided model that addressed the existence argument in novel ways but almost totally disregarded 
the extension and exhaustion arguments” (Maskell and Kebir, 2005, p. 6).  Hassink and  Dong -H o (2005) 
indirectly supports their view, by observing that many contemporary cluster scholars “…belong to the recently 
coined family of territorial innovation models….They increasingly turned from “economic” reasons for growth 
of new industrial agglomerations to ‘social’ and ‘cultural’ reasons... (p. 571, emphasis supplied). 
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To organize the discussion, we adopt the previously labeled phases: 1. existence, 
2. expansion, and 3. exhaustion9.  Discussion will focus on each of the principal 
stages separately, including additional sub-phases, drawing upon published and 
draft entries in Table 1 or from other works that have conducted research related 
to certain stages.  
2.1 Existence Phase 
 This initial phase includes what must happen before a cluster emerges 
sufficiently to be recognized as “existing”.  For Maskell & Kebir (2005), 
existence could be triggered by a variety of processes that lead to co-location.  
In reviewing various accounts of the existence phase, they refer first to the 
presence of tightly packed Marshallian locational economies and spillovers10 as 
the principal drivers of initial co-location, although how these first come into 
being as cluster factors remains undeveloped.  Building on this view, co-location 
in existing agglomerations gradually permits the endogenous emergence in 
modern economies of positive externalities and generally favorable business 
conditions, to which additional firms are attracted and, in certain industries, are 
presumably better able to exploit (and develop further) through co-location 
(Lorenzen, 2005)11. 
   Beyond the traditional Marshallian points, Maskell and Kebir (2005) note 
Michael Porter’s (1990) stress on the importance of local rivalry plus intra- and 
inter -firm information conduits.  In marked contrast to Porterian concepts of 
rivalry, innovative milieu theorists place emphasis on pre-existing community 
values, cooperation and social capital, which “…act as an uncertainty-reducing 
mechanism in the innovation process” (Maskell and Kebir, 2005, citing 
Camagni, 1995, p. 320), thereby building trust, common work ethics, and joint 
economic endeavors.  A clear inference is that existing community and social 
practices establish hospitable circumstances in which innovative agents are 
eventually able to prosper, a point also frequently advanced in the social capital 
literature, most forcefully and earliest by Putnam (1993).   
 Whether Marshallian or milieu-centric in nature, such accounts of cluster 
existence are better at establishing the necessary, although not sufficient, 
                                                
9Perhaps a fourth “extinction” phase also applies, which in mild form simply refers to one cluster being replaced 
by its successor (see discussion in section 2.2.1).  The utter collapse of a cluster and its host region is 
exceedingly rare, although places such as Bardou, a former “supply region” in Jane Jacobs view, represents the 
rare type of place history passed by as it became economically extinct and abandoned (Jacobs, 1984, pp. 34-5). 
10  Johansson (2005) provides a thorough dissection of the various externalities and spillovers discussed in the 
classic literature and much of its progeny. 
11 Wolter (2003) expands this notion first by acknowledging historical accident and by explicating what she calls 
the “set-up” phase, which is “…characterised by small, slowly growing numbers of companies… [surviving 
where localization and ] agglomeration benefits and costs are weak, leaving a greater role for geographic ones in 
determining industry location and development” (p.6).  Although the title of Wolter’s paper suggests that it 
examines cluster life-cycles, and strong parallels are clearly evident, the text focuses heavily on the regional 
“agglomeration” context within which clusters play a major development role.  
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conditions for cluster emergence.  Historical legacies and chance play important 
roles as well.  As examples, Krugman’s account of the origins of tufted rug 
innovations (1991, p. 59-61) suggest how sparks of local entrepreneurial 
consequence can arise from simple gift-giving between friends and strangers, 
while Tappi’s (2005, p. 297-304) summary of accordion design-diffusion 
reveals the spark  ignited locally  by expatriates who acquired external contacts 
and information that enabled them to detect and organize overlooked local 
potentials (see also Sable, 1982, p. 222-223).   Clusters therefore usually result 
from some early historical initiative.  Even so, policy efforts to substitute 
publicly-sponsored programs of cluster stimulus for the Schumpeterian calculus 
of entrepreneurs are increasingly prevalent, even though conventional cluster 
wisdom by now firmly counsels policy support only after entrepreneurial 
activity has demonstrated cluster viability. 
 Among the most focused efforts to understand how clusters emerge are 
scholars who attempt to model theoretically and empirically the process of 
clusters coming into existence, drawing upon tools of population ecology, 
complexity analysis, agent-based modeling, etc. to characterize self-organization 
among cluster agents that may lead to later transitions between cycle phases.  
Brenner (2004) proposes that cluster emergence requires a minimal presence of 
industrial firms (i.e. naturally occurring presence of firms “seeded” by 
externally -driven industrial cycle dynamics)  12, plus increases in exogenous 
demand for the products of these firms.  It is then a question of whether that 
demand becomes sufficiently strong to trigger an expansion of firms beyond a 
minimal, pre-cluster stable state to a critical mass that attains a higher stable 
state capable of setting off endogenous (“self -augmenting”) cluster growth 
dynamics driven by firm entry and exit.   
 Maggioni (2004) employs a somewhat different population ecology model 
to account for cluster birth and take-off, which adopts the perspective of an 
existing firm that might wish to locate in a potential cluster.  Early locators 
calculate their net benefits and, if warranted (e.g., a “critical cluster mass” has 
been attained), enter the cluster, thereby driving up the average profitability of 
this location to the next potential locator (enhanced spillovers and positive 
externalities), but also driving up congestion costs.  Swann, et al (2002) also 
focus on critical mass as the essential “existence” event that stimulates co-
location, although their interest is less in contributing to the development of 
cluster cycles than in examining entry variation of firms to a cluster at points 
along its cycle.  In this view, entry by external agents is a function of the 
strength of a cluster in a given industry and the strength of clusters in all other 
industries.  
                                                
8 An external industry cycle “seeds” a new cluster in this and most modeling strat egies; cluster cycle theorists 
assume external industries arise from an innovation, even though such innovations might endogenously incubate 
initially within another parent cluster . 
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2.2  Expansion Phases 
 Initially favorable existence conditions described above are the necessary 
pre-requisites for a cluster’s critical mass to suddenly take-off, where self-
organized “swarming” of new firms, technologies and innovations, products and 
cluster related activities occur rapidly and promiscuously.  Perhaps this sub-
phase could be distinguished and labeled as Exploratory Expansion: it is 
typically concentrated before the inflection point of the typical cluster “S” curve 
where rates of expansion in cluster scope activities is greatest.  This phase13 
corresponds with a “entrepreneurial technological regime,” identified by Winter 
(1984, p. 297), “…that is favorable to innovative entry, but unfavorable to 
established firms.”  The latter are, in Winter’s term, “routinized technological 
regimes” that dominate the following Exploitative Expansion  phase, during 
which systematic exploitation, cluster scale-economies, process technologies 
and efficient firm routines drive growth, often aided by the deliberate policies 
dedicated to the improvement and expansion of beneficial advantages. Such 
policies include—presumably—remedying any newly revealed scale-inhibiting 
bottlenecks that might limit the continued expansion of the cluster.14   
 2.2.1 Exploratory Expansion. Initial stages of the familiar Marshallian15 
„expansion“ trajectory might be described at this sub-phase as an exuberant 
exploration of how initial pecuniary spillovers originating in cluster -specific 
infrastructure, specialized worker training and education, key supplies of skilled 
labor, emerging specialized suppliers, and increasingly compliant institutional or 
regulatory practices that favor expansion and competition might be incorporated 
into successful business models. Maskell and Kebir (2005, citing Porter, 1998, 
p. 241, 221) add that 
 “…developing clusters also attract—and cluster participants seek out —people and 
ideas that reinforce the cluster.  Growing clusters attract skilled people through 
offering greater opportunities.  Entrepreneurs or individuals with ideas migrate to the 
cluster from other locations as well, because a growing cluster signals opportunity.”   
Incumbents and—presumably—opportunistic arrivals as well benefit from a 
cluster’s innov ative milieu, which  “…facilitates mutual acquaintance, collaboration, 
dissemination and exchange of information, just as it allows for the development of trust relations” 
(Maillat, 1998, p. 19, cited in Maskell and Kebir, 2005).  During this intensely 
exploratory period of self-organisation, the firms of each developing cluster may 
gradually and quite intuitively assemble and collectively refine a unique series 
of beneficial capacities, some of which may also become the “isolating 
                                                
13  Swann (1998, 2004) divides the overall cluster expansion phase into “take off” and “peak entry” of firms. 
14  Magioni (2005, 28-30) refers to those which expand the upper size limit or carrying capacity of a cluster as 
„K-policies“, while those established to accelerate rates of growth during exploratory expansion are “r-policies”. 
15  Strictly speaking, this phase could also be described as “Schumpterian”, since it usually follows some previous 
disturbance that stimulate entrepreneurial ambitions and willingness to explore the potentials of new 
technologies, markets or business models, and whose dynamics are partially responsible for Schumpterian -
cycles.  However, the principal elements examined here and in the literature remain those of Marshall, which 
confirms general tendencies—as reported by Windrum (nd, p. 3)—to “bow to Schump eter while talking of 
Marshall”.  
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mechanisms” that help sustain growth and protect them from external regional 
competitors (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999, pp. 176-178).   
 Brenner (2004, ch. 2) reviews carefully a series of distinct mechanisms 
that have feedback-loops and are self -augmenting, i.e. are “growth inducing.”  
These include mechanisms that arise between firms (e.g., Marshallian spillovers, 
spin-off firms, etc.) and interactions among firms and other cluster agents 
(human capital, research institutions, etc.).  The intensity of the expansion 
process from endogenous self-augmenting processes is seen by Brenner as 
further tempered by global (mainly industry) and local (social, cultural, 
governmental) factors1 6.  Maggioni (2005) confirms several of these and 
identifies a further series of mechanisms and agent behaviours that accelerate 
the exploratory phase, adding to the list models of success-signalling to external 
agents, anchor tenant and leader-supplier dynamics, legitimating agent-forms, 
emerging diseconomies, and information diffusion.  Swann (2002, 59) notes that 
for innovative clusters “…in the formative (introduction and growth) stage of 
the life cycle, geographical proximity may be critical to tacit technology 
transfer—which is so essential to industry development—and hence the positive 
effects are large”.    
 The speed with which all such factors propel a cluster is, from an 
ecological perspective, the difference between the birth and mortality rates of 
the firm population, which Magionni expresses as the net rate (r) that determines 
a cluster’s growth potential.  Swann’s model (2002, 58) is similarly based upon 
firm entry as the principal dynamic, where entry rates are highest in the 
strongest of competing clusters; the model further implies that entry-driven 
growth will tend to favor specialized clusters “…if like firms convey benefits on 
incumbents while unlike firms do not, then if space is limited, it is better to 
group together with like firms.”   
 Bergman (2006) observed that Austrian incumbent firms of strong 
regional clusters operating where opportunities to innovate or invest were self-
reported as “excellent” also drew heavily upon universities, venture capitalists 
and regional firms to help generate and develop new innovations, while seldom 
relying upon formal cluster support organizations.  They behave very much as 
Porter might predict by deliberately positioning their products in international 
markets, valuing highly-demanding customers both internationally and 
regionally, and by monitoring supplier quality and customer feedback from 
regional customers.   
The most successful clusters progress directly from the exploratory to the 
next stage where some measure of dominance is attained through scale 
expansion, thereby fitting the stylized “S” curve dynamics; however, lesser—
probably typical— clusters have considerable difficulty escaping their initially 
                                                
16  In understanding processes of cluster cycles and change, Lorenzen (2005, 205) favors theories and models that 
view cluster dynamics as products of both endogenous and exogenous processes, since “As can be seen, there is 
still quite some way to go before we reach a composite understanding of how exogenous and endogenous 
processes play together in changing clusters”. 
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exuberant phase or to attain scale or industry dominance.  Two examples 
illustrate the life-cycle interruptions faced by lesser clusters, each at different 
speeds.   
Tappi (2005, 298-304) describes a lengthy series of periodic adjustments 
taken by the musical instrument cluster following its emergence in Marche 
(Italy), early in the 20 th century.  During that century, it moved from accordions 
to electric and electronic instruments to digital equipment and specialized digital 
applications as a matter of necessity during periods when demand and tastes 
shifted and new technologies began to penetrate its existing products, all which 
transpired through a cascade of family and small firm dynamics, temporary 
scalar expansions, mergers, spin-offs and startups.  Originating as a household 
workshop, its entrepreneurial efforts and expanding firm population produced in 
the ensuing century a continuously evolving series of interrelated clusters, 
passing through several cluster “half-lives”, rather than becoming a single 
cluster that faced maturity at a single point in its life-cycle.  It might be argued 
that the vast majority of clusters have similar histories, gradually enriching their 
host regions over time by expos ing them to an ever-broader palette of 
technologies and sectors that under -gird a capacity to learn and adjust over time, 
supportive of other clusters but never becoming dominant17 in a specialized 
field, nor perhaps  even dominant in their host region.  However, this broader 
experience may also form the basis for what innovative milieu theorists envision 
by being “…potentially able to utilize the tensions that emerge during the process of change 
by guiding the localized production system towards a new state in which the territorial logic 
continues to manifest itself” (Maskell and Kebir, 2005, p. 12). 
 The Danish mobile-communications cluster emerged far more recently 
and has already adjusted numerous times during its relatively young life, a 
process accelerated by the profoundly rapid pace of innovation.  Dalum, et al 
(2005, p. 231) focus on the role played by disruptive technologies to develop 
their “…analysis of sequential disruptions by using the concept of technological life-cycles, 
and to apply this to a single case over an extended period of time, including several 
(technological) cycles.”  An accelerated scenario of early entrants, enabling 
institutions and universities, buyouts, mergers, takeovers and exits reflect the 
highly unstable state of cluster development in North Jutland as repeatedly 
improved mobile telephone technologies shifted the attention of cluster agents 
swiftly from NMT to GSM to UMTS, only to be challenged again most recently 
by the WLAN family of technologies developed elsewhere.  In comparison with 
the March musical cluster, it involves a much narrower group of technologies 
and sectors active over a far shorter 25 year time frame, but this cluster too has 
yet to “take off” as a scale-efficient growth cluster, and it too is probably qu ite 
representative of supporting—not dominant—technology-intensive clusters 
                                                
17  Dominance is a term based upon Utterback and Abernathy’s concept of “dominant designs” to signify any of 
the few similar clusters whose principal product(s) control large market shares and which continue to produce a 
stream of innovations that support continuous cluster upgrading, incessantly diffusing uncritical phases and their 
organizational units across the cluster landscape.  Lesser clusters in far larger numbers specialize in the 
components, modules, inputs or niche products that support and complement dominant clusters.  
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found throughout many modern regional economies.  In this view, the vast 
majority of clusters may experience life-cycles that never pass to the succeeding 
phase.   
 2.2.2  Exploitative Expansion.  Once this phase of cluster expansion has 
been attained—in Tichy’s view (1999, p. 233)—it: 
 “…appears to be the best of all worlds to participants.  It is the phase, nevertheless, which 
may generate the first deviations [that] cause later troubles.  Success is easy in this phase, 
so that little pressure exists to search for further development of the cluster’s strengths, for 
other applications of its knowledge, etc.  It is tempting to concentrate on the best-selling 
product and to produce it in ever-increasing quantity, utilising economies of scale. 
Members tend to focus less on exploring new options and more on protecting 
advantages that earlier arose quite spontaneously, identified by Maskell and 
Malmberg (1999) as regional “isolating mechanisms”, three of which are 
relevant to this stage:  
“...isolating mechanisms arose in innovative regions that sustain them by 
protecting them from external regional competitors.  First, asset mass efficiency is the 
idea that historically agglomerated R&D and related innovation assets are not easily or 
readily duplicated in competing regions.  Second, time compression diseconomies  are 
the costly but necessary lags a competing region must overcome while trying to master 
and replicate the capacities of a superior region, which can busily continue to build 
upon its strengths through increasing-returns processes.  Last, an externally inscrutable 
interconnectedness of asset stocks implies that simply replicating each asset stock 
produces no sense of how they are deployed effectively, which is another way of 
saying that accumulated assets develop DNA-like usage patterns not visible or 
apparent to outsiders or even to those who daily draw upon this embedded DNA.” 
Bergman (2006)    
Cluster members may complacently assume such isolating mechanisms are 
effectively permanent features , and perhaps  also begin to rely more heavily  upon 
membership in formally structured and managed organizations to protect 
initially advantaged positions.  For example, Bergman (2006) found firms that 
self- identified membership in relatively mature Austrian clusters (i.e., featuring 
a broad range of firms and supporting institutions) indicated such membership 
provided access to good buyer trend information; these same firms sold 
relatively little of their output to demanding international customers or to non -
European markets and perceived no advantages in ISO certification, thereby 
forfeiting opportunities to learn about global market changes and competitors.  
In contrast, their general orientation placed comparatively high value on  internal 
member-supported R&D contacts, acquiring or developing innovative ideas 
principally from same-sector firms and cluster-organizations, but relatively little 
from university and venture-capital sources.  While mature cluster firms 
welcomed the entry of additional firms to the cluster, they saw no relative 
benefits of competition.   
Additional forms of complacency may also begin slowly to erode initial 
cluster advantages during periods of consolidation and slowdown.  Very 
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significant limits to growth and overall cluster carrying-capacity arise from the 
more rapid rise in congestion costs that offset advantages as clusters attain 
greater scale.  Congestion costs are among the important classic factors that 
Maskell and Kebir (2005, p. 6) find most absent in much of the contemporary 
cluster literature: “The extension argument of centrifugal forces was, in contrast [with 
contemporary views], normally based on the costs of congestion, or the bidding-up of prices 
for land, labor or the services of goods provided, but could be extended to include negative 
spillovers when different industrial logics clashed.”  Escalating congestion costs of 
clashing industrial logics are explicitly incorporated by Swann (2002) who 
observes that congestion costs rise disproportionately as entrants from different 
clusters bid up local prices, while additional firms of each cluster add few or no 
Marshallian advantages to the other, therefore accelerating the loss of net 
benefits to potential entrants of either cluster, which probably favors initial 
tendencies toward single cluster specialization.  Swann describes this as a 
pivotal situation:   
“[As] the industry enters its maturity stage, the benefits of clustering start to tail off, 
and eventually the costs of clustering outweigh the benefits…At this stage the cluster 
is approaching its peak, but has not entered the decline phase as such.  It may be 
growing very slowly, but it is not getting smaller.  That stage starts when the 
industries  located in the cluster start to decline.” (2002, p. 54).   
Elsewhere, Swann (2004, slide 18) summarizes the process in greater detail, 
deploying a matrix that indicates the effect of successive cluster entrants on 
various agents, until the “final entrant” at whic h point no agents and only 
consumers benefit.  In portraying the structure of congestion costs, Maggioni 
(2005, p. 13-28) deploys an ecological model that draws heavily upon an 
elaborately conceived micro-foundation of congestion costs to examine potential 
rates of cluster growth, cluster carrying-capacity and external challenges to 
mature incumbent clusters. 
 To this point, we have focused on the processes by which a cluster 
matures and moves beyond its earlier innovative phases by adopting 
standardized, scale-efficient process technologies; perhaps firms have even spun 
off establishments and facilities that no longer benefit from local cluster 
advantages.  Swann (2004, p. 54) poses rhetorical questions whose obvious 
answers are responsible for slowing or h alting the entry of firms to incumbent 
clusters:  
“As new industries emerge, firms in those industries may then be faced with location 
decisions of the following sort.  Should they locate in an old cluster, where they have 
little commonality with incumbents, where the established infrastructure is dated and 
where congestion costs are still relatively high, although admittedly declining?  Or do 
they locate in a new cluster where the incumbents, though new and small, are 
generating the sorts of spillovers that attract entrants and are based in more relevant 
industries, and where the infrastructure is better?”   
Brenner (2004, p. 37) sees consolidation across clusters, with severe life-cycle 
consequences for some, as the natural outcome of entry decisions by firms, 
particularly at later stages of industry evolution: 
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“At some point in time the global firm population and therefore also the supply increases 
faster than demand.  As a consequence, competition becomes more fierce and finally leads to 
an increasing occurrence of shakeouts.” 
It seems clear that one cannot consider the life-cycle of a cluster in the absence 
of its core industry life-cycle.  In their broad study of industry life cycles and 
clustering, Audretsch and Feldman (1996, p. 271) conclude that “…what may serve 
as an agglomerating influence in triggering innovative activity to spatially cluster during the 
introduction and growth stages of the industry life cycle, may later result in a congestion 
effect, leading to greater dispersion in innovative activity.”  Cluster growth may suddenly 
or gradually slow, oscillating around a stable state at some upper limit; the state 
of affairs obtained from this orderly and incremental development path is 
perceived by firms and other cluster agents in Tichy’s words, “…as the best of 
all possible worlds…”   
 However, a mature cluster in such a stable state may not be prepared for 
the unexpected disturbances it absorbed easily during its earlier exploratory rise, 
disturbances that now threaten its stable maturity.  Maggioni (2005, p. 21) 
describes the following effects on established clusters:   
“As long as the technology undergoes ‘normal progress’ (i.e. follows a technological 
trajectory) the interchange of knowledge within the established cluster will tend to 
preserve its leadership.  When new technologies arrive that are discontinuous with 
those that came before (i.e. change the technological paradigm) existing industry 
concentration may be of little value and the result then is that new technologies tend to 
be exploited in new clusters that do not suffer the diseconomies associated with an 
established cluster.”   
Events of this kind pose qualitatively different challenges to mature clusters than 
to clusters at earlier stages, which suddenly interrupt the slow, gracef ul aging 
enjoyed by comfortable clusters.  
 
2.3  Exhaustion Phase 
 Exhaustion arises at that point on a cluster’s life-cycle when maturity 
itself poses a clear threat to continued cluster viability.18   Tichy describes the 
situation thus (p. 230): 
“As the number of firms is reduced, sophisticated networks are no longer necessary, as no 
new information has to be transferred; nor are clusters any longer competitive, compared with 
vertically integrated firms, as the number of nodes has been drastically reduced.  The smaller 
the networks, however, the less—and the less new and stimulating—information they can 
provide, the lower therefore the chance of the cluster inventing new products, new processes, 
or a new organization.  The cluster has aged; the region in which the cluster is located has 
become a problem area, a region with little endogenous potential to find new 
dynamics.”What details characterize this situation and how do we understand the 
possibilities?  First, the depletion of some vital mineral or material resource may 
lead to exhaustion, or the milieu deteriorates (Maskell and Kebir, 2005, p. 9, 
quoting Maillat, 1998, p. 15), which results when “…opportunistic behavior 
                                                
18As a cluster  approaches a possible inflection point on its life-cycle curve, it could  again turn upward as a 
revitalized, renascent cluster, or instead decline—as net location benefits plummet —more or less rapidly from an 
unsustainable maximum limit. 
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causes defiance or the outward openness becomes inadequate to ensure the 
enlargement of new cooperative relations or the replacement of technologies”.  
A strongly contrasting view of competitive vs. cooperative behavior, perhaps 
addressing wholly different kinds of clusters, sees risk arising in both 
“…important intra-cluster forces (such as  ebbing domestic rivalry, the 
development of internal rigidities and regulatory inflexibilities) as well as a 
number of externally induced influences (such as technological discontinuities, 
deteriorating factor conditions, and shifts in buyer’s needs. (Por ter, 1990, 166-
169; 1998, 243-244, cited in Maskell and Kebir, 2005, p. 8).19  Whatever the 
causes, growth and regeneration that occurred almost automatically in early 
phases grinds to a complete halt and the cluster pauses.  At this point, either one 
of two different directions is possible.  The pause extends and is “locked-in” for 
an extended period of time; alternatively, the cluster experiences a renaissance, 
perhaps immediately or following a temporary period of lock-in. 
 
 2.3.1  Lock-in.  A significant strand of the cluster “lock-in” literature 
could be seen as framing the exhaustion phase in rich detail.  Although seldom 
presented as a distinct life-cycle phase, lock-in describes well the inwardly-
spiraled layering of events and decisions that steadily shrink “protectively 
isolated” clusters, thereby progressively insulating them from external 
influences or internal impulses for change.  Developed as territorial analogs of 
technological lock-in concepts advanced earlier by David (1985) and Arthur 
(1994 ), industrial district lock-ins were applied first to clusters and regions by 
Grabher (1993), then extended by Hassink (2005a, 2005b) and others.  This 
expanded literature typically drew upon accounts of lingering malaise that afflict 
certain sector-dominated clusters, particularly in German iron, steel and 
shipbuilding regions.  Grabher identifies some of the factors described at the 
exploitation phase as responsible for effectively locking a cluster or region into 
an exhausted sense of possibilities: too much inward orientation and group-think 
(cognitive lock-in, which becomes  difficult to “unlearn”), too tightly-tied local 
connections (functional lock-in among locally -oriented networks), and excessive 
dependence upon non-firm agents and compensatory support (political lock-ins 
that deny market viability issues).   
It is not merely that such factors diminish a mature cluster’s viability; 
rather, they appear steadily to anesthetize cluster agents, reducing their ability to 
recognize and make timely adjustments to fundamental changes brought on by 
radically altered markets, technologies and vibrant new global competitors that 
                                                
19Additional symptoms of how a cluster’s endogenous advantage-mechanisms (Maskell and Malmb erg, 1999, p. 
178-179) could disappear are summarized by Bergman (2006):  “asset erosion …takes place as ‘…hitherto 
important institutions in a region are no longer reproduced at the same pace or to the same degree.’  [R]egional 
lock -in can develop when initially important institutions and practices—often social and cultural in origin—
focus on self-preservation or aggrandizement and become a sclerotic risk (Olson, 1982) to—rather than the life-
blood of—regional progress.” 
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swarm newly formed or renascent clusters.  This is the fate experienced by a 
vast landscape of “old industrial area” clusters, whose former fortunes and 
privileged status often become irretrievably lost, although new futures might 
still be imagined, given a dramatic change in agents, industries and technologies.  
The continuing downward (and perhaps unstoppable) spiral of the U.S. auto 
industry and Detroit’s auto cluster is mirrored worldwide, perhaps leading many 
eventually to near-petrification (e.g., iron and steel of Ruhr region).  The 
chances, if any, for a successfully restructured innovative milieu may require 
considerable time: “As milieus tend to change more slowly than industries, a 
sclerotic milieu can remain in a region even after the industrial structure to 
which it belonged has already disappeared” (Hassink, 2005, p.573).    
 
 2.3.2  Renaissance .  However, marked transitions—some quite 
dramatic—have been documented in former clusters of European (e.g., iron and 
steel in Styria to automobile production and supply) and U.S. regions (e.g., from 
tobacco and cigarettes in Durham, NC to medical-biotechnology)20 .  These are 
quite logically seen by many as success cases and scrutinized heavily by policy 
analysts eager to identify the specific measures and actions responsible.  One 
must surely acknowledge some policies are better suited to triggering successful 
restructuring than others, but these often differ strongly across unique cases, 
thereby frustrating efforts to generalize about overall approaches that mig ht be 
valuable.  The identification of common cluster cycle factors at work might be a 
more appropriate first step, as these may then be leveraged from place to place 
with rather different policies21.   The simple passage of time is surely necessary 
for a broad spectrum o f spontaneous reactions to begin, following cluster 
recognition of an exhaustion crisis, not least of which is the gradual replacement 
(and perhaps reduction) of original agents with newcomers, the depreciation and 
replacement of obsolete infrastructure and institutions, the re-pricing of unit 
factor costs or capital assets, and a reactivated appreciation for external ideas, 
innovations and technologies.  This can seldom be avoided, even though painful 
to absorb.  It is equally painful to recognize that one’s cluster is probably losing 
ground to competitors that meantime are rapidly establishing “time compression 
diseconomies” of their own, thereby extending an insurmountable lead in 
stronger versions of the old cluster22.  Painful readjustments take place in nearly 
all exhausted clusters, although not all recover satisfactorily and some not at all, 
even with lengthy passages of time23.  There are additional assets some clusters 
and regions enjoy that may help speed or ensure the process of restructuring.   
                                                
20  Toedtling and Trippl (2003);  Bergman and Goldstein (2001). 
21  For example, Toedtling and Trippl (2005, pp. 1211-1215) offer a range of policy guidelines  that apply to 
different types of regions. 
22  Recognition of local loss and competitive external clusters is often unacceptable in politically active regions, 
where „catch-up“ and recovery measures are taken prematurely that work to retard the necessary readjustments 
and realignments.   
23  In addition to the typical resource boomtown stories, Jane Jacobs’s discussion of Bardou in France (1984, p. 
32-33) illustrate the fate of highly dependent regional economies that failed historically.  
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Of these, three will be mentioned that have received attention in various 
literatures: agent diversity, polyvalent technology sources, and 
knowledge/science base. 
 
2.3.2.1 Agent Diversity 
 Clusters that face exhaustion and cannot self-regenerate easily have 
become deeply specialized along too many core dimensions, operating in 
extreme cases as a highly-specialized, homogenous cohort of agents captured in 
a self-constructed silo2 4.   A mono-vintage homogeneity trap could result from 
extremely rates of rapid cluster development, during which nearly all agents, 
technologies and awareness of external environments originate over a very short 
span of time; this would effectively eliminate a temporally-varied portfolio of 
sustainable knowledge available within the cluster.  Homogeneity is further 
enhanced in cases when congestion-cost increases favor the development of 
single-cluster regions; moreover, competences within a single cluster may 
hyper-concentrate if firms operating at the edge of a cluster are drawn inward 
towards its principal technological trajectory (Fornahl and Menzel, 2003, p. 5). 
However, single-cluster tendencies are comparatively infrequent in all but the 
smallest and a few larger regions, usually resource- intensive.   
Cluster diversity of some type and degree is more the norm: “…London’s 
success as a cluster also derives from its history of attracting a diverse mix of industries, and 
its pre-eminent success at exploiting convergence between technologies” Swann (2002, p. 
63).  London and similar cities reflect the so-called “Jacobs Externalities” of 
variety and inter -sectoral exchange that are characteristic of large metropolitan 
agglomeration economies25.   At the same time, even in lesser regions, 
neighboring clusters include an ensemble of different sectors, industries, 
technologies, business models, and entrepreneurial or creative spirits that could 
help stimulate regeneration.  While the pain of incumbents during the 
adjustment process is palpable, so too are opportunities and released resources 
made visible to other local cluster agents and their extended networks.  Novelty 
and the ability to use existing resources in novel ways, “…is seen more likely in 
networks comprising actors with different backgrounds, e.g., in extra-regional or international 
networks…,(which engage) the support of selected outside specialists to help them counteract 
lock-in and survive” (Visser, E-J. and Boschma, R.A. (2004, p. 803)). Networked 
and even n eighboring cluster agents are likely of varying age and origin, they 
conduct business with different models or under varying organizational 
structures, and satisfy innovative needs from differing knowledge bases26, 
thereby providing new insights of considerable relevance to exhausted clusters.  
 
2.3.2.2  Polyvalent Technology Sources  
                                                
24  See Fritz and Mahringer (1998) and Tichy (1998) for a review of risk-related issues that cluster agents and 
supporters should consider well before exhaustion sets in. 
25  Henderson, Kuncoro, and Turner.  (1995, p. 1068). 
26  Hansen, Vang and Asheim (nd ) 
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 While an exhausted cluster may become wholly preoccupied with its 
deeply ingrained routines, common wisdoms, sunk costs and its technological 
predispositions, the surrounding region may contain overlooked technological 
resources and perspectives of great value.  An exhausted cluster may eventually 
draw the attention of others to its unexploited local potentials for technological 
convergence: “If industry A generates spillovers of some value to new entrants in industry B, then 
the cluster, while an early centre for industry/technology A, will subsequently become a center for B.  
This, as much as movements in relative prices, is the key to cluster revival” (Swann, 2002, p.64).  
Swann further notes that chemical and ICT clusters are anything but silo-
technologies: rather, they partner “polygamously” with several sectors (2002, p. 
65).  Of the 23 clusters formed by input-output relations and value-chains, 22 
consisted of sectors that supplied inputs to more than a single cluster (Feser and 
Bergman, 2000, p. 5-7), thereby bridging common relationships between them; 
the top-3 ranked clusters (metalworking, vehicle manufacturing and 
chemicals/rubber ) were each supplied by 23 to 28 specific sectors that also 
supplied  inputs to at least one additional cluster 27.  This implies a broad palette 
of possibilities for tapping common supply-chain technologies that, if seized 
upon, could spark the regeneration or reconfiguring of an exhausted cluster. 
 At the same time, regeneration is likelier to succeed if the skill-set of the 
region’s resident labor pool is capable of adapting to more than one industry or 
technology.  Marshallian labor pooling assumptions focus upon the constellation 
of labor skills valued heavily by the few sectors of a single cluster, but perhaps it 
is more realistic to consider the key occupations of sectors that span several 
clusters.   Feser (2003) reviews the literature of several skill-equivalent research 
studies as background to empirically estimate which combinations of over 600  
specific occupations belong to 21 distinct and homogenously-defined skill 
clusters (including illustrations  of 4 knowledge-intensive occupational clusters 
in 10 important U.S. regional economies).  These skill clusters represent distinct 
knowledge-based labor pools within which workers are able to move between 
components of several industrial sectors and clusters, thereby potentially 
stimulating revitalization of an exhausted cluster. 
 
2.3.2.3  Science-Knowledge Base 
 How and whether technological adjustments among clusters actually take 
place may—in the view of many—depend upon the effectiveness of the local 
system of innovation available to cluster agents.  Local or regional (RIS) 
innovation systems have received much theoretical and policy attention, 
particularly conceptual arguments or specific case studies of how they are 
structured, populated, classified, and governed28, but empir ically-based 
generalizations concerning RIS potentials to reverse cluster or regional decline 
are notably absent.  Universities and research institutes, essentially knowledge-
                                                
27  Clusters ranked 4-10 also received, on average, inputs from 11 specific sectors that supplied at least one 
additional cluster. 
28  See Doloreux and Parto (2004) for a useful synthesis of this literature. 
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generating and diffusing institutions, are also considered key members of a local 
innovation system29, although for Betts and Lee (2004, p. 35 ) “...there is a tendency 
in the literature to perhaps overplay the role of universities and underplay the role of the 
private sector…”, a sentiment also echoed by Laursen and Salter (2004 ) who argue 
that direct customer and supplier relationships remain far more important in 
terms of innovation than the “…largely indirect, subtle and complex” relation 
with universities . One should therefore be cautious about the prospects for 
stimulating exhausted clusters based solely or principally upon the local 
availability of an active science base. 
 The presence of universities and research centers near exhausted clusters 
represents potential access to the local science base and its academically 
networked glo bal science base as well.  For Betts and Lee (2004, pp. 2-3), these 
potentialities may be expressed in one or more of the following: 1. trainer 
(human capital formation), 2. innovator (direct commercialization), 3. partner 
(joint projects and research), 4. talent magnet (attract external knowledge-
intensive workers), and facilitator (networking), to which Goldstein and Renault 
(2005, p. 74) add 6. knowledge generation and research infrastructure, and 7. 
innovation leadership.  UK universities were found to be most frequently 
involved at least once during 2002-3 with firms in conferences and meetings 
(65%), as consultants or contract researchers (56%) or joint research partners 
(45%), with higher frequencies being reported in chemistry, engineering and 
materials sciences , which are similar to overall findings reported by Mowrey 
and Sampat (2004) for U.S. survey respondents (industrial R&D managers).              
Whether these potentials are well suited to existing firms now barely 
surviving in exhausted clusters remains in doubt: Prevezer (2002, pp. 233-4) 
states cluster incumbents “…do not absorb spillovers arising either from other 
sectors or from the science base”, while Laursen and Salter (2004) report “…the 
propensity to use universities increases with the degree (percentage) of sales 
devoted to R&D”, which affirms the importance of absorptive capacities of 
cluster firms at the exploratory—not exhaustion—phase in gaining access to 
scientific inputs.  A study of European firms indicate that collaborations 
between firms and industries decrease as the share of firm sales accounted for by 
innovative products rise, which suggests only long range, pre-commercial 
possibilities are pursued in joint university efforts (Knudsen, Dalum and 
Villumsen, 2001, pp. 15-16): unwelcome news to exhausted cluster firms 
seeking short range remedies.   
Clusters located near an accessible science-base may have indeed once 
enjoyed and perhaps still retain  remnants of a strong R&D culture and 
absorptive capacity , but more distant clusters will surely  lack these advantages , 
and even locally -based clusters may have become effectively insulated through 
inwardly focused activities.  The risk of inward orientation is great: Laursen and 
Salter (2004) found that university impacts accrued very narrowly to a subset of 
                                                
29For discussion of innovation systems and universities, see Betts and Lee (2004) and Mowrey and Sampat 
(2004). 
 17 
UK firms in a few sectors that have maintained capabilities in R&D and  have 
adopted an “open”—not closed—approach to innovative search.   
 
3.0   Conclusions  
 The weight of findings and concepts discussed here is not intended to 
support a novel or revised version of cluster life-cycles.  Rather, relevant life-
cycle concepts are seen as leading to a better understanding of detailed phases 
and stages, using the conventional life-cycle as a discussion template.  They also 
help illuminate further other important facets and features of clusters that may 
have been glossed over or perhaps draw attention to questionable generalizations 
concerning clusters observed at widely varying stages or phases that have been 
prematurely reached.   
 In conducting this review of concepts, several implicit assumptions 
embedded in the literature were needed to clarify various points, which may 
prove useful in future research concerning cluster life-cycles.  First, at present 
there is no single best metric of cluster activity, nor is there an agreed-upon 
aggregation principle by which to create one.  This means that firms, employees, 
capital investment, sales, output, value-added, etc. have been used in many 
different studies, with sometimes predictably opposing results.  Second, the very 
idea of aggregating metrics raises the cluster to the level of a “representative 
agent”, somewhere between a firm and an industry.  This is usually observed in 
research papers that imply or attribute logic , motive, incentive and action to a 
cluster.  Third, active cluster s are frequently considered to exhibit homogeneous 
structures, e.g., all institutional elements “self-organize” along similar lines , 
including the possibility of creating support institutions to reinforce such 
behavior.  Fourth, traded clusters alone are subject to forces and incentives that 
expose them to the possibilities of a full cluster cycle, particularly clusters that 
specialize in globally-traded products.  Indeed, such clusters are truly “trade 
generators”—which surely attracts policy-makers so strongly to the concept—
unlike locally-defined clusters that concentrate mainly to produce and distribute 
efficiently that output demanded within the local region.  Finally, exposure to a 
complete life-cycle is likely only for a much smaller subset of traded clusters 
that at some point becomes dominant in national or global terms. 
 Additional points that arose within the discussion of specific cycle phases 
may deserve further exploration and research.  Several authors try to establish 
the existence of a cluster with reference to the exogenous presence of an 
innovative product, technology or industry (PTI) available for exploitation in 
hospitable locales.  This raises the question of whether PTI were in fact 
generated previously in other clusters that proved incapable of retaining and 
exploiting possibilities.  Perhaps Cliometric ians might wish to backtrack 
histories of scattered PTI families “separated at birth” to evaluate the 
endogenous origins of clusters: as a counter-factual example, assume one or two 
of the “Fairchildren” (Betts and Lee, 2004, p. 12) had initially exited Silicon 
Valley (e.g., Intel) and instead moved elsewhere to establish a new cluster.  
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Alternative cluster origins, i.e., non-PTI, worthy of consideration are the 
traditional products or practices embedded in formerly untraded regional 
clusters that somehow gain international cache and grow to become the traded 
products of concentrated clusters.  One could argue that several Italian industrial 
districts arose through such a process; this appears to be one of the defining 
differences between such districts and the innovation-intensive clusters of more 
typical PTI origins.   
 Existence has also been attributed in certain clusters to chance and 
random events that happened in retrospect to have favored a location, but isn’t 
there a story  embedded somewhere behind every cluster, successful or not?  
Perhaps random events favor the first-mover rather than follower, amenity-rich 
chances may displace those in amenity-poor localities, or chance could more 
easily take root in SME-intense vs. company-dominated localities, and so on.  
The contribution of economic historians could be exceedingly valuable in 
untangling the origin of clusters that somehow reached the existence stage. 
 While the expansion phase has attracted much research and conceptual 
examination, there may still be opportunities to explore further key differences 
in agent behavior and cluster composition at what are called here the exploratory 
and exploitive sub-phases.  While the expansion of a cluster  is generally 
observable, there may be underlying shifts, for example, in the amounts, sources 
and uses of venture capital prior to some inflection point during the overall 
expansion; or perhaps major adjustments in  relationships and channels through 
which innovative inputs are acquired  help signal this point. Growth in sentiment 
for and progress toward establishment of cluster support institutions may trigger 
the shift, as might unit-price increases  demanded by local factor owners who are 
able to valorize nearby externalities (congestion costs).  Which shifts prove to be 
pivotal in triggering the continuing exploitative phase in clusters of various 
types  is surely worthy of further  investigation. 
   Equally interesting and relatively unstudied  are the consequences for  the 
much larger class of exploratory clusters that do not progress to an exploitive 
phase or eventually  come to enjoy some measure of dominance, but rather as in 
the Marche and North Jutland cases3 0 continue to  host an ongoing series of 
supporting clusters, essentially  providing key services or inputs to dominant 
clusters elsewhere until such opportunities are exhausted and then moving 
nimbly to the next opportunity.  What may appear to be a “failure to thrive” and 
become a dominant cluster may in fact be an investigation-worthy  key to 
understanding the sustainable, slowly developing economies in many regions 
and communities. 
 How to avoid lock-in remains a principal lesson of life-cycle policy 
research and formulation, and much has been learned  about its avoidance even if 
not always observed in practice.  Far less is known about how clusters escape 
                                                
30  The fabled inability of Route 128 to become and remain a dominant computer/ICT cluster may reflect s imilar 
tendencies , although at a more advanced stage of expansion and maturity.  However, the Boston region has since 
entered other highly successful clusters, which may prove even more beneficial than its ICT predecessor. 
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once locked-in, perhaps because so few have managed it.  Instead, various 
factors that appear to account for lock-in avoidance are proposed as potential 
escape measures. In addition to the timely mechanics of  routine market 
adjustments, three measures were discussed from the perspective of offering 
lock-in remedies, however surprisingly little research has been devoted to 
studying their effectiveness in this respect.    
 Exhausted, locked-in clusters accessible to diverse agents, polyvalent 
technologies or strong  science bases have difficulty applying these and other 
resources to their situation.  Th e Michigan automobile cluster, for example, is 
situated nearby several universities, including one of the strongest public U.S. 
research universities, but appears incapable of drawing upon its exceptional 
science base to reverse cluster fortunes.  Nor apparently has Pittsburgh 
effectively exploited Carnegie-Mellon University ’s formidable scientific 
prowess in its transitions, although Boston has weathered the near-total loss of 
its ITC cluster and entered wholly new clusters, clearly drawing on the strength 
of its university-rich science base.  More focused research might help us 
understand, as examples, how Boston’s released ICT cluster resources were 
redeployed in other local fields (or relocated elsewhere), how precisely 
automobile cluster firms in Michigan’s extreme mono-culture now interact 
differently than before with local world-class universities, or how previously 
effective self -organized economic communities unravel in ways that prevent 
potential innovations from being recognized or deployed.   
 It is entirely probable that lock-ins are “technically escapable” in many 
cases, i.e., innovations are available that would permit various degrees of 
renewal or renaissance.  However, there may be failures of action or 
effectiveness that remain serious impediments to unlocking cluster malaise.   
Perhaps an exodus of expertise has depleted the cluster of key talents or it is 
now afflicted by an exhaustion of willful energies and Keynesian “animal 
spirits”.  Forms of communal senility (Atkinson, 2000, Part 5) may have set in, 
seriously depleting hard-earned strengths of self-organization and reciprocal 
sacrifice that drove the cluster’s earlier expansion.  How to recognize and 
understand the possible reasons that underlie collective failures to act effectively 
surely deserve as much research attention as how these capacities were 
developed initially at cluster exploratory and exploitation phases.  Although the 
literature concerning cluster life-cycles has grown rapidly and offers many 
useful points, it may have thus far collected only the lowest-hanging fruit. 
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Cluster Life-
cycle Sources 
Cycle Stages 
Identified 
Featured 
Stage(s) 
Evidence supplied Principal Purpose 
of Contribution 
Tichy (1998) Creation 
Growth 
Maturity 
Petrification 
All Literature review, 
case illustrations 
and policy 
examples 
Pose relevant 
policy actions at 
various cluster 
cycle stages 
Swann (2002) Critical Mass 
Take-Off 
Peak Entry 
Saturation 
All “Entry” firm 
simulations 
modeled for tech-
intensive clusters 
Framework to 
evaluate UK/US 
bio-tech and 
computer clusters 
Fornahl and 
Menzel 
(2003)* 
Emerging 
Growing 
Sustaining 
Stagnating 
All Literature review, 
concept 
exploration 
Examine role of 
firm foundings at 
cluster life-cycle 
stages 
Wolter (2003)* Set-up 
Growth 
Change 
Adaptation 
All Literature review, 
model dynamics, 
case illustrations 
Develop life-cycle 
theory of 
agglomerations  
Brenner (2004)  Entry  
Exit 
Growth 
All Population ecology 
modeling of 
clusters 
Propose complete 
cluster theory and 
life-cycles 
Maskell and 
Kebir (2005)*  
Existence 
Expansion 
Exhaustion 
All Marshall, 
“Millieu” and 
Porter concepts  
Identify key gaps 
in “Cluster 
Theory” 
Lorenzen 
(2005) 
Arise 
Decline 
Shift 
All Contributions of 
edited volume, 
editorial overview 
Develo p editorial 
framework 
Hassink and  
Dong-Ho 
(2005) 
Positive 
Negative 
Lock-ins  Contributions of 
edited volume, 
editorial overview 
Develop editorial 
framework 
Maggioni 
(2005)* 
Birth/takeoff 
Golden age 
Maturity 
All Population ecology 
modeling of 
clusters 
Relate cluster 
dynamics to other 
innovation  
Bergman 
(2006) 
Formative 
Growth 
Maturity 
Petrification 
Maturity Literature review, 
cluster survey 
evidence, simple 
correlations 
Sustainability 
factors tested 
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